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Q5Energy savings and CO2 emission reduction have become a major issue in recent years. Taxes on energy produc-
tion sectors may be an effective way to save energy, reduce CO2 emissions, and improve environmental quality.
This paper constructs a dynamic recursive ComputableGeneral Equilibrium (CGE)model to analyze the impact of
the energy tax on energy, economy, and environment from the perspective of tax rates and tax forms (specific tax
and ad valorem tax). The results show that adjusting the tax system and the tax rate has important implications
for energy conservation while having minor impacts on the output of other industries. The impact of an increas-
ing energy tax on the energy demand is greater than the impact on sectoral output, indicating that energy effi-
ciency will be increased to some extent. The CO2 reduction will increase over time when an ad valorem tax is
implemented on enterprises. We found that ad valorem tax has greater elasticity of economic output, energy de-
mand, and CO2 emission reduction. The results support the direction of China's resource tax reform. However, we
argue that it is better to increase the tax rate relatively and relax the control on energy prices so that energy ef-
ficiency will increase.
© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Climate change caused by Greenhouse Gas (GHG) has become a
major problem that requires an urgent solution. Energy savings and
CO2 emission reduction have become major topics of discussion and
have been widely researched (Fan et al., 2016; Li and Jia, 2016). Several
scholars have been working on methods for sustainable development
(Moran et al., 2008; van Weenen, 1995). Low-carbon economy is cur-
rently a very hot topic, andmany policy instruments aimed at achieving
it, such as resource tax(Frestad, 2010; Xu et al., 2015), carbon tax (Chen
et al., 2017; Li and Jia, 2017) and emission trading scheme (Babatunde
et al., 2017; Hart and Zhong, 2014; Li et al., 2017; Song et al., 2018)
have been studied or implemented.
Taxes can not only distribute income, adjust corporate structure
(Fang et al., 2017; Jia andMa, 2017), but also regulate economic and re-
source balance. Taxes on energy production sectors or energy consump-
tion may be an effective way to save energy, reduce CO2 emissions and
improve environmental quality. Hu et al. (2018) analyzed the effects of
different environmental tax returning rate on China's economy, and163.com (Z. Jia).concluded that environmental tax is not harmful to economy; more-
over, it can effectively curb the SO2 emissions of pollution-intensive sec-
tors. Kaplowitz andMcCright (2015) examined how specific persuasive
messages and policy characteristics affect supports for a gasoline tax in-
crease using eight survey experiments. Many studies have focused on
economic or environmental effects of a CO2 tax such as Mardones and
Baeza (2018), Mardones and Flores (2018), Chen and Nie (2016), Li
et al. (2018) and Wang et al. (2018).
Several works of literature have studied the effect of tax reform on
energy industries (Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, 1997; Weinthal and Jones
Luong, 2001). Deroubaix and Lévèque (2006) examined the political
controversies caused by environmental tax reform project and the
why it eventual collapsed, hoping it could help to solve the political dif-
ficulties of implementing environmental policies. Rocchi et al. (2014)
analyzed the potential influences of energy tax directive reform on
price levels in the various industries in 27 EU countries. Orlov (2015)
analyzed the economy-wide effects of reducing export taxes on crude
oil as well as oil products compensated by increasing the royalty on
crude oil using Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. The re-
search found that the method provides a certain gain of allocative effi-
ciency; however, the policy is not superior. Thampapillai et al. (2014)
illustrated how the re-investment of the resource rent tax and other
Table 1
The process of China's resource tax reform.
Year Process of China's resource tax
1984 Creating resource taxes on crude oil, natural gas, coal, and iron ore
1994 Establishing comprehensive resource tax on all mineral resources
2004 Adjust the standards for taxation on some items such as coal, crude oil,
natural gas, and manganese ore, etc.
2006 Cancellation of 30% reduction of non-ferrous metal mineral resources tax
policy; adjustment of iron ore resource tax reduction policies, etc.
2007 Raise the tax rate of coking coal resources; adjust the tax reform policy for
salt resources
2010 Tax reform for crude oil and natural gas piloted in Xinjiang (specific
collection to ad valorem collection)
2011 Natural gas resource tax becomes ad valorem tax nationwide
2014 Coal resource tax becomes ad valorem tax nationwide
2 B. Lin, Z. Jia / Energy Economics 84 (2019) 104496government revenue from mining can reduce the depreciation of the
mine.
In addition, some prior studies focused on resources tax. Frestad
(2010) studied corporate hedging under a resource rent tax regime.
Zhang et al. (2013) analyzed the impacts of resource tax reform using
the CGEmodel in Xinjiang province, China. They found that themain in-
fluence of the reform is just good to local government finances, but en-
ergy conservation or emission reduction. Similarly, Tang et al. (2017)
analyzed the impact of China's coal resource tax reform (from specific
tax to ad valorem tax) in December 2014 using CGE model, and the re-
sults indicate that the reform policy would improve the energy struc-
ture: coal consumption will suffer a great decrease while cleaner
energy will increase. Liu et al. (2017) analyzed the impact of China's re-
source tax reformon the coal industry by applying a two-stage dynamic
gamemodel that takes the coal production industry and thermal power
plants as the players.
However, these studies only focus on tax reform on energy produc-
tion sectors (such as coal production sector). Few pieces of literature
focus on the impact of tax changes (both in tax forms and in tax rates)
in the energy industry on energy, economy, and environment. Energy
production sectors are the lifeline of a country and the tax rate on
these sectors may directly affect the economy and security of the coun-
try, as well as energy saving and CO2 emissions reduction. Thus, this
paper explores the different results of different tax forms and rates, an-
swers the question of which tax form and rate will have a better impact
on the economy, energy, and environment, and presents the conclusion
and findings of the study and proposes several policy implications fur-
ther. The contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) This paper established a dynamic recursive CGE model to analyze
the impact of different tax reforms and tax rates. We explained the
modeling process in more details relative to other studies, hoping
to provide some references for other CGE modelers.
2) This paper considers the impact of different tax systems (fixed tax,
specific tax, and ad valorem tax) in different tax rates on energy,
the economy and the environment. Comparedwith the previous re-
search, this paper is more comprehensive from a research
perspective.
3) This paper obtains several interesting findings and proposes some
specific implications for China, especially regarding China's re-
sources tax reform in the coal industry.
The basic structure of this paper is organized as follows: the intro-
duction and literature review are presented in Section 1. The research
background is introduced in Section 2. CGE model and the method of
model dynamics are introduced in Section 3. The data source and the
scenario design are described in Section 4. The simulation results and
discussions are provided in Section 5. Sensitivity analysis is Provided
in Section 6. The conclusions and policy implications are proposed in
Section 7. Abbreviations in this paper are listed in Appendix A to make
this paper more concise and easy to read.
2. The process of China's resource tax reform
Resource tax is levied on individuals or industries and imposed
based on the amount of initial resources. The purpose of the tax is to
promote the rational development and utilization of enterprises re-
sources and to facilitate the overall function of taxation leverage
cooperating with other taxes. Table 1 lists several major events in
China's resource tax.
China's resource tax was levied in 1984, and crude oil, natural gas,
and coal were levied first. Resource tax had been a specific tax for
many years. Taking the coal industry as an example, the resource tax
is 2–5 CNY per ton of raw coal and eight CNY for coking coal before
the year of 2009. That is almost no tax at all (less than 1% of sales reve-
nue). Moreover, tax rates also had no moderating effect on the market.In order to protect resources. The tax had been reformed from specific
tax to ad valorem tax one after another. In this paper, we mainly focus
on the tax on energy production enterprises instead of the whole re-
source tax.
3. Methodology
3.1. CGE model
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE)model is widely used for the
analysis of policy impact (Borgomeo et al., 2018; Dai et al., 2016; Hosoe,
2015; Qian et al., 2017). Different from an input-output model (Chen
et al., 2018; Cui et al., 2015) or a game theory analyses, the CGE model
can better analyze the impact of target issue on the whole society. We
summarize three characteristics of the CGE model in this paper (Bye
et al., 2018; He and Lin, 2017; Hosoe, 2018).
1) The behaviors of producers' pursuing profit maximization and con-
sumers' pursuing utilitymaximization are clearly reflected by the re-
lationship between supply and demand.
2) The quantity and relative price are both endogenous in the model,
and the resource allocation method is determined by the general
equilibrium model structure with Walras's law.
3) The focus of this model is on simulating the behavior of the eco-
nomic entity (government, enterprises, and household). The re-
sources of the economy in the model have been fully utilized.
The CGE model built in this paper is based on a standard CGE
model in Hosoe et al. (2010). We then extract some intermediate
input into factors using Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)
functions, while the original model uses the Cobb Douglas produc-
tion function in the bundle of factors (labor and capital). We also
separate households into two parts: one is rural population, the
other is urban population. As the original model does not aim to an-
alyze energy and environmental issues, we have added an energy-
environmental block into the model and have made the static
model dynamic.
The basic modeling structure is based on Lin and Jia (2019) and Lin
and Jia (2018a), which consists of five blocks: production block,
income-expenditure block, trade block, energy-environmental block
and macroscopic-closure & market-clearing block. The framework of
this paper's model is depicted in Fig. 1.
3.1.1. Production block
The CGE model in this paper assumes that one sector produces only
one product. The production block has six levels of nesting. Value-
Added & Energy (VAE) and intermediate input make up the domestic
output bundle following a Leontief production function. In the 2nd
level, VAE is a bundle that consists of Capital-Energy bundle and labor
input following a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function.
Enterprise
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Fig. 1. The framework of the CGE model in this paper.
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input following a CES function. The energy bundle consists of electricity
and fossil energy input following a CES production function. Fossil en-
ergy is the bundle combined with refined oil and Primary Fossil Energy
(PFE) following a CES function. The last level of nesting is PFE bundle,
which consists of coal, crude oil and gas input following a CES function.
The elasticity of this block is set according to Fujimori et al. (2012), both
in non-energy conversion sectors and energy conversion sectors. The
production structure of non-energy conversion sectors is illustrated in
Fig. 2 and the production structure of non-energy conversion sectors
is illustrated in Fig. 3.Energy
CE
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Domestic Output
Refined oil PFE
Electricity
Labor
Fossil energy
Capital
Coal Crude oil Gas
=0
=1.2
=1.1
=1.6
=1.0
=1.5
Fig. 2. The production structure of non-energy conversion sectors in the CGE model.3.1.2. Income-expenditure block
This block introduces four social subjects: government, enterprise,
households, and the rest of theworld. They have their own balanced ap-
proach. Details can refer to Lin and Jia (2018b). The trade deficit is exog-
enous, according to Hosoe et al. (2010).
3.1.3. Energy-environmental block
This block describes how physical quantities of energy consumption
and value quantities of energy input are related, and how to measure
CO2 emissions created by activities, which is similar to Fujimori et al.
(2012).Energy
CE
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Fig. 3. The production structure of energy conversion sectors in the CGE model.
Table 2
AEEI, capital depreciation rate and capital stock of each sector in CGE model.a
Sector's abbr.b AEEI Depreciation rate Capital stock
AGR 0.025 0.050 4516.3
COL 0.006 0.062 1549.6
OIL 0.006 0.065 1174.0
GAS 0.006 0.065 263.4
REF 0.006 0.065 1353.3
CMC 0.015 0.055 6363.6
MTL 0.025 0.055 7085.1
MTP 0.02 0.055 1526.7
ELC 0.025 0.048 9136.3
TRA 0.033 0.052 9654.0
CST 0.006 0.055 2992.6
RST 0.01 0.052 30,068.9
OTH 0.016 0.055 26,228.8
SER 0.023 0.045 38,443.5
a AEEI will be in half after 2020.
b Sector's abbreviations can be referred to Table 5.
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Likemost studies, Armington assumption is introduced into the CGE
model (Beck et al., 2018; Lin and Wu, 2018; Wu et al., 2017). By using
CES function (see Eqs. (1) to (3)), we differentiate domestic production
from domestic consumption goods and import goods from domestic
consumption. Using CET (Constant Elasticity of Transformation) func-
tions, we simulate enterprises' distributions of production in the do-
mestic market and international market, as shown in Eqs. (4) to (6).
Tariffs and indirect taxes also play a role in the production decision of in-
dustries in this block.
Qi ¼ γi δmiMiηi þ δdiDiηi
 1=ηi ð1Þ
Mi ¼
γiηiδmiPQi
1þ τmi
 
PMi
" # 1
1−ηi
Q i
ð2Þ
Di ¼
γiηiδdiPQi
PDi
  1
1−ηi
Q i
ð3Þ
Zi ¼ θi ξeiEϕii þ ξdiDϕii
  1
ϕi ð4Þ
Ei ¼ θi
ϕiξei 1þ Tzi=Zi=PZið ÞPZi
PEi
" # 1
1−ϕi
Zi
ð5Þ
Di ¼ θi
ϕiξdi 1þ Tzi=Zi=PZið ÞPZi
PDi
" # 1
1−ϕi
Zi
ð6Þ
where Qi and PQi are the quantity and price of Armington commodity
of the sector i. Mi and PMi are the quantity and the price of imported
products of sector i. Di and PDi are the quantity and the price of
domestic production goods for the domestic consumption of the
sector i. δmi and δdi are import and domestic distribution factor of
production function of Armington composite commodity. γi and θi
denote scale coefficient of CET and CES function. ηi and ϕi are substi-
tution parameter and transformation parameter based on calcula-
tions of elasticity of substitution and elasticity of transformation,
respectively. τim is the tariff rate of the sector i. Zi and PZi are the quan-
tity and price of domestic output of the sector i. Ei and PEi represent
the quantity and the price of exported products of sector i. ξei and ξdi
are export and domestic distribution factor of the production function
of the domestic commodity.
3.1.5. Macroscopic-closure & market-clearing block
Government budget balance, foreign trade balance, and investment-
saving balance are three market closure principles are taken into ac-
count in this model. And we also considered two principles of market
clearing: one is Armington commodity and the other is factors (labor
and capital). All are simple assumption of the CGE model, which can
refer to Hosoe (2004).
3.1.6. The setting of tax form and tax rate
Three kinds of tax forms are assumed in this paper: fixed tax, specific
tax, and ad valorem tax. The first is a fixed amount of taxation in a pe-
riod, which is independent of economic conditions. The tax department
generally imposes fixed taxation on privately or individually owned
business. The second is based on the sale amounts of productions/re-
sources, and this tax form is the initial resource tax form in China. In
China, some kinds of tariffs, resource taxes, excise taxes, travel taxes,
and salt taxes are imposed at the form of specific taxes. The last type
of taxation is based on the sale's value of productions/resources(quantity multiplied by price). The three kinds of tax form can be
expressed by the mathematical statement like the following equations.
Tzi ¼ Fixi ð7Þ
Tzi ¼ τzi Zi ð8Þ
Tzi ¼ τzi PZiZi ð9Þ
where Tzi is the tax on the sector i. Fixi represents the amount of fixed
tax on the sector i. τiz denotes the tax rate. Zi is the amount of domestic
output of the sector i. PZi represents the price of domestic output of the
sector i. Eq. (7) is the fixed tax, while Eq. (8) is specific tax and Eq. (9) is
ad valorem tax. This paper assumes that all other industries are on ad
valorem duty except for fossil energy production industries (coal, oil
and gas production industries) which are on specific duty during
2012–2018.
3.2. Model dynamics
In this paper, a recursive method is used tomake the CGEmodel dy-
namic. Some of the exogenous variables/parameters are updated in dif-
ferent periods, after, the new equilibrium is solved over again. This
paper considers three principles for the model dynamic: capital accu-
mulation, the population growth and technological progress (which is
measured by Autonomous Energy Efficiency Improvement, AEEI). Cap-
ital input is equal to capital depreciation and it is calculated via a perpet-
ual inventory method: capital depreciation is determined by the capital
stock of the current period, depreciation rate and social investment. The
capital depreciation rate is illustrated in Table 2.
AEEI in CGE model is considered in this study according to the rele-
vant literature (Li et al., 2017) andMedium and Long-term Energy Saving
Special Planning (National Development and Reform Commission,
2005). Table 3 depicts the value of the parameter of AEEI in each sector.
Labor endowment, which is an exogenous variable, is determined by
National Population Development Plan (2016–2030) (The Central
People's Government of the People's Republic of China, 2017). Table 3
shows the population growth rate in this paper.
4. Data source and scenario design
4.1. Data source and Social Accounting Matrix
The 2012 China Input-Output Table (CIOT) is used to construct a Social
AccountingMatrix (SAM) in this paper which is a basic datum of the CGE
model (China Input-Output Association, 2015). To analyze energy issues,
an energy balance table is constructed and the data of this table was ob-
tained from China Statistical Yearbook (National Bureau of Statistics,
Table 3
Population growth rate in this paper.
Year Population growth rate
2012–2015 0.60%
2016–2020 0.60%
2021–2025 0.21%
2026–2030 0.15%
Table 5
Scenario design of tax form on energy production industries.
Scenarios Tax form Changes
S Specific tax 0%
S− Specific tax −20%
S+ Specific tax +20%
F Fixed tax 0%
F− Fixed tax −20%
F+ Fixed tax +20%
A Ad valorem tax 0%
A− Ad valorem tax −20%
A+ Ad valorem tax +20%
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we declare that the CO2 emission in this study is only from energy con-
sumption, and excludes biological breath, microbial decomposition, and
carbon sinks and carbon emissions from land and sea. We reclassify the
139 sectors in the CIOT into 14 sectors, as shown in Table 4.
4.2. Scenario design
In order to promote energy conservation and environmental protec-
tion, China began implementing the reform of ad valorem taxation on
coal resources nationwide from December 2014 (Ministry of Finance
of China, 2014). Thus, this paper assumes fossil energy production in-
dustries (coal, oil and gas industries) are on specific duty rather than
ad valorem duty before 2017,whichmeanswe assume that the govern-
ment collects specific taxes on fossil energy companies. Moreover, in
this paperwe consider the three kinds of tax form: the tax based onpro-
duction (specific tax, which is simulated by S, S− and S+ scenarios), the
tax based on a fixed amount (fixed tax, which is simulated by F, F− and
F+ scenarios) and the tax based on the value of sale (ad valorem tax,
which is simulated by A, A− and A+ scenarios). We consider scenario
S as the Business as Usual (BaU) scenario where fossil fuel companies
pay taxes as specific tax during 2012–2030. In the countermeasure
(CM) scenarios, such as A and F scenarios, the tax form of fossil energy
industries will be changed in 2018. We also establish six scenarios to
simulate the changes in tax rates based on different rules: S− and S+
scenarios are scenarios where the tax rate of fossil energy sectors falls
or rises by 20% under the S scenario. F−, F+, A−, and A+ scenarios
are similar to S− and S+ scenarios. The scenario design of tax form
on energy production industries is illustrated in Table 5.
5. Results and discussion
5.1. Economic impact
5.1.1. GDP
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2030 is illustrated in Fig. 4. GDP
will reach 105.94, 105.95, 105.93, 105.94, 105.94, 105.95, 105.86,
105.90, and 105.80 trillion Yuan under the S, S−, S+, F, F−, F+, A,Table 4
Description and coverage of industry classification and population classification.
Abbr. Industries
AGR Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery
COL Coal mining and washing industry
OIL Petroleum exploitation
GAS Natural gas exploitation
REF Refined oil
CMC Chemicals
MTL Metal smelting and rolling products
MTP Metal products
ELC Electricity
TRA Transportation, warehousing and postal services
CST Construction
RST Real Estate
OTH Other industry
SER Services
RUR Rural residents
CTZ Urban residentsA−, andA+scenarios, respectively. TheGDP variations in these CMsce-
narios relative to the S scenarios will be −0.005%, 0.010%, −0.001%,
0.005%, −0.005%, 0.080%, 0.037%, and 0.132%, respectively. We found
that the tax rate in the ad valorem tax system has a significant negative
correlation with GDP, which means higher tax rate of fossil energy will
result in lowerGDP performance. The result also shows, by comparing S,
F, and A scenarios, that the tax formwill less significantly influence GDP
than the tax rate. GDP is lowest in A scenario, compared with S, F, and A
scenarios. In addition, we found that the tax rate in fixed tax formwould
have positive correlations onGDP to some extent, indicating that the tax
rate for fixed taxes is already too low and not suitable for the changing
economy over time as discussed in Section 5.1.2. Moreover, the GDP
elasticity with respect to tax rates is analyzed, and we conclude the fol-
lowing findings:
1) GDP performancewill be better in scenarios of specific tax and fixed
tax, and it will be worse in the ad valorem tax scenario. The reason
may be that although the advalorem tax is feasible and can better re-
flect the market rules (increasing or decreasing prices of products),
the ad valorem taxes are higher than specific taxes due to the rise
in energy products (see Section 5.1.2). Therefore, the GDP loss
caused by chain reaction is higher (which will be explained in
Sections 5.1.3 and 5.1.4).
2) The elasticity of GDPwith respect to the tax rate is highest in the sce-
narioswith the ad valorem tax and lowest in the scenarioswithfixed
tax, which means increasing tax rate on enterprises based on ad
valorem duty will result in more GDP loss. The high sensitivity of
GDP to ad valorem tax rate indicates that the government should
pay more attention to tax rates when enterprises are on ad valorem
duty.
5.1.2. Indirect tax
Fig. 5 and Table 6 show the changes in indirect tax in all industries in
all scenarios in 2030 relative to the S scenario. The changes in the tax
form in the fossil energy sectors will directly affect the indirect tax of
these sectors by −57.04% to 119.80% in 2030 relative to the S scenario.
It should be declared that we assume tax reform is implemented in
2018, and the differences in indirect tax between these scenarios are lit-
tle but the gap will increase over time. For other industries, the impact
on the indirect tax will be no more than −4.28% to 2.47%, which is sig-
nificantly lower than the impact of the tax of energy production sectors.
In addition, the tax structure of indirect tax in all scenarios in 2030 is
shown in Table 7. We found that the proportion of indirect tax on fossil
energy production sectors is sensitive to the tax form and the tax rate: it
will be 1.96%–7.27% in 2030.
The impact of the tax rate and the tax form in energy production sec-
tors on the indirect tax of other industries is relatively low,which can be
nearly negligible. The main reason is that taxation has led to higher en-
ergy prices, but energy factors are only small part of the costs of other
downstream companies, and therefore there are insignificant effects
on their costs and outputs (see Sections 5.1.3 and 5.1.4). The indirect
taxation of non-energy production companieswill not changemuchbe-
cause the impact of the energy tax on the non-energy output is not very
large, indicating that the energy tax has less negative effects on other
105.70
105.75
105.80
105.85
105.90
105.95
106.00
S S- S+ F F- F+ A A- A+
T
ri
lli
on
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n
CM scenarios BaU scenario
Fig. 4. GDP in all scenarios in 2030.
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Fig. 5. The variation of indirect tax of all industries in all scenarios relative to S scenario in 2030.
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main downstream enterprises of energy production sectors (such as re-
fined oil and electricity) is the opposite of the change in energy produc-
tion sectors. For example, electricity tax will increase while the tax on
the coal industry will reduce in S+ scenario. The main reason is the
price factor, which is illustrated in Fig. 6. Moreover, we found that the
changes in the tax form can significantly impact on indirect tax as well
as their tax rates, especially in ad valorem tax.Table 6
The variation of indirect tax of all industries in all scenarios relative to S scenario in 2030 (%).
Scenario AGR COL OIL GAS REF CMC MT
S 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
S− −0.05 −18.73 −14.53 −14.64 0.53 −0.08 −0
S+ 0.05 18.19 12.47 12.61 −0.50 0.08 0
F −0.14 −35.29 −46.30 −46.16 1.34 −0.23 −0
F− −0.17 −48.23 −57.04 −56.92 1.69 −0.28 −0
F+ −0.11 −22.35 −35.56 −35.39 0.99 −0.18 −0
A 0.20 87.64 44.68 45.47 −2.25 0.34 0
A− 0.12 53.95 30.18 30.60 −1.39 0.21 0
A+ 0.26 119.80 54.90 56.06 −3.03 0.46 05.1.3. Commodity price
Fig. 7 illustrates the variation of the commodity price in all CM sce-
narios relative to the S scenario in 2030. The prices will reduce in S−,
F, F−, and F+ scenarios while it will rise in S+, A, A−, and A+ scenar-
ios. The price in fossil energy production will be affected in the range of
−4.58% to 8.54%while other priceswill be affected by notmore than 2%.
The main reason is that the fossil energy industries are basic industries
of an economy so that the commodity prices and energy prices remainL MTP ELC TRA CST RST OTH SER
.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
.05 −0.08 0.77 −0.08 −0.07 −0.08 −0.09 −0.12
.05 0.07 −0.72 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.11
.13 −0.21 1.96 −0.24 −0.17 −0.18 −0.24 −0.31
.16 −0.26 2.47 −0.29 −0.22 −0.23 −0.29 −0.39
.11 −0.17 1.45 −0.18 −0.12 −0.13 −0.19 −0.22
.22 0.32 −3.19 0.34 0.28 0.32 0.37 0.47
.13 0.19 −1.98 0.21 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.30
.31 0.43 −4.28 0.46 0.36 0.44 0.50 0.63
Table 7
Tax structure of indirect tax in all scenarios in 2030.
Scenario Indirect tax The proportion of indirect tax
Energy
sectors
Non-energy
sectors
Total
indirect
tax
Proportion
of fossil
energy
tax
Proportion of
non-fossil
energy
tax
S 801.68 18,899.36 19,701.04 4.07% 95.93%
S− 669.44 18,893.28 19,562.72 3.42% 96.58%
S+ 923.10 18,905.00 19,828.10 4.66% 95.34%
F 471.69 18,882.38 19,354.07 2.44% 97.56%
F− 377.35 18,878.43 19,255.78 1.96% 98.04%
F+ 566.03 18,886.42 19,452.44 2.91% 97.09%
A 1320.80 18,923.23 20,244.04 6.52% 93.48%
A− 1132.67 18,914.32 20,046.99 5.65% 94.35%
A+ 1484.90 18,931.14 20,416.04 7.27% 92.73%
7B. Lin, Z. Jia / Energy Economics 84 (2019) 104496basically synchronized in the direction of change, with other conditions
unchanged. In this section, we obtain several results:
1) The fixed tax will reduce prices in all production while the ad
valorem tax will increase them.
2) Increasing tax rates on energy productions will raise commodity
prices.
3) The elasticity of prices in fossil energy productionwith respect to en-
ergy tax is higher that of non-energy prices.
4) Price is more vulnerable to ad valorem tax rate than fixed tax and
specific tax, which is similar to the result of GDP.
5.1.4. Industrial output
The variation in industrial output in all CM scenarios relative to S
scenario in 2030 is depicted in Fig. 8. In F, F− and F+ scenarios, the out-
put of coal, oil and gas industries will increase by 2.61–4.73%,
15.31–24.36%, and 14.86–24.71%, respectively, and the output of refined
oil and electricity will increase by 1.48–2.56% and 1.87–3.22% while theIndirect tax of energy 
industries
Cost of energy
Output of 
conversion in
Indirect tax of energy 
conversion industries
Positive
Positive
Fig. 6. The relationship between tax on energy industries and energy
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Fig. 7. The variation of commodity price in all Coutputs of other industries will be less affected. The output of coal, oil,
and gas will be directly affected by the tax form and tax rates, and this
influence will initially involve energy transformation industries (such
as refined oil and electricity industries), and finally spread to all indus-
tries. Through changes in sectoral output, we found that adjusting the
tax form and tax rates have great potential for energy conservation,
while they have a minor impact on the output of other industries.
5.1.5. International competitiveness of industries
China is a big net exporter of goods. So this paper wonders if the
changes of tax form will impact on the international competitiveness
of export-oriented industries. Firstly, we figured out an indicator, export
divided by total output in SAM, then selected those industrieswhose in-
dicator is above 1%, and analyze the changes in export of these indus-
tries. As depicted in Fig. 9, we found that the export of the refined oil
industry will decrease more than 2% when the tax system changes
from specific to ad valorem. If fixed tax is implemented in energy pro-
duction industries, the industry will increase more than 2% of exports.
However, other industries show a stable performance in export and
commodity price (Section 5.1.3). It seems that the taxes have few effects
on competitiveness of the Chinese economy.
5.2. Energy impact
5.2.1. Fossil energy demand
Demands for coal, crude oil, natural gas and refined oil in all sectors
in all scenarios in 2030 are illustrated in Figs. 10, 11, 12 and 13, respec-
tively. Fossil energy demands for the coal, oil and gas industry are most
affected by the changes in energy tax by-36.07% to 26.46%. The next is
the downstream industries, such as refined oil and electricity by
−8.02% to 4.57%. The results show that electricity is still the biggest
coal consumer accounting for 44.68% of total coal demand in 2030.
The coal demand of the electricity industry is also the most vulnerable industries
Commodity price of 
energy industries
Raw material of energy 
conversion industries
energy 
dustries
Positive
Negative
Positive
conversion industries when tax on energy industries changes.
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Fig. 8. The variation of industrial output in all CM scenarios relative to S scenario in 2030.
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Fig. 9. The variation of export in all CM scenarios relative to S scenario in 2030.
8 B. Lin, Z. Jia / Energy Economics 84 (2019) 104496industry to the changes in energy tax form and tax rates except for fossil
energy industries. Demand will range from 1559.57 million tons of coal
equivalent (Mtce) to 1772.97Mtce. Almost all crude oil is consumed by
the petroleum processing industry. Changes in the tax form and tax
rates can also change the oil demandof the petroleumprocessing indus-
try: consumption will be 955.69Mtce in A+ scenario and 1066.26Mtce
in F− scenario. The demand for natural gas is relatively low in China and0.00
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Fig. 10. Coal demand of all sectors and the variation of coal dthe impact is similar to coal demand. The transportation industry is the
biggest consumer of refined oil which accounts for 50% of refined oil
consumption in China. Unlike electricity or refined oil industries, trans-
portation is nearly less affected by energy tax. The main reason is that
the increase in energy tax will directly and significantly raise the cost
of energy price, but indirectly andmodestly increase the price of refined
oil (which can refer to Section 5.1.3), so that the cost of transportation-40%
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emand in all CM scenarios relative to S scenario in 2030.
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Fig. 11. Crude oil demand of all sectors and the variation of crude oil demand in all CM scenarios relative to S scenario in 2030.
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Fig. 12. Natural gas demand of all sectors and the variation of natural gas demand in all CM scenarios relative to S scenario in 2030.
9B. Lin, Z. Jia / Energy Economics 84 (2019) 104496will be affected moderately. Moreover, we noticed that the changes in
the energy demand are similar to the variations in industrial output,
which is determined by the enterprise production function.
As for the demand for fossil energy by residents, we found that the
coal demand of the rural population is more affected than that of0.00
50.00
100.00
150.00
200.00
250.00
300.00
350.00
400.00
AGR COL OIL GAS REF CMCMTLMTP
t
nela
vi
u
qe
la
o
C
f
o
s
n
ot
n
oilli
M
S S- S+ F F
S S- S+ F F
Fig. 13. Refined oil demand of all sectors and the variation of refineurban population. The reasonmay be that coal is needed by rural people
in northern China to keep the house warm in winter, unlike the urban
population. Also, the price elasticity of low income people is greater
than that of high income people. However, we observe the opposite im-
pact on the household demand for gasoline or diesel (refined oil). Urban-40%
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Fig. 14. Electricity demand of all sectors and the variation of electricity demand in all CM scenarios relative to S scenario in 2030.
10 B. Lin, Z. Jia / Energy Economics 84 (2019) 104496residents will change their demands for refined oil more than rural res-
idents. This is because the demand of urban population is far higher
than that of rural people: the consumption of town is 13.28 times that
of the countryside.
5.2.2. Electricity demand
The electricity demand of all sectors and the variation of it in all CM
scenarios relative to S scenario in 2030 are illustrated in Fig. 14. The var-
iation in the electricity demand is similar to the variation in fossil energy
demand. The total electricity demandwill be 7935.11, 7997.58, 7875.86,
8090.08, 8130.77, 8048.57, 7670.02, 7770.90, and 7577.19 billion kWh
(B-kWh) in the S, S−, S+, F, F−, F+, A, A−, and A+ scenarios respec-
tively. This indicates a change of 0.00%, 0.79%, −0.75%, 1.95%, 2.47%,
1.43%, −3.34%, −2.07%, and −4.51% relative to the S scenario. The im-
pact on residents' electricity demand is insignificant, as the impact on
residents is the last link in the transmission mechanism (fossil energy
companies - energy transformation companies – other companies - res-
idents). Moreover, we found that the impact of a rising energy tax on
energy demand is greater than the impact on sectoral output. So it can
be argued that energy efficiency will increase to some extent, which is
discussed in Section 5.2.3.
5.2.3. Energy efficiency
The variation in energy efficiency in all CM scenarios relative to S
scenario in 2030 is illustrated in Fig. 15. Energy efficiency in this paper
is calculated by domestic output divided by energy consumption in-3
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Fig. 15. The variation of energy efficiency in all Ceach sector. Energy efficiency will increase in S+, A, A−, and A+ sce-
narios by 0.38–4.53% and will reduce in S−, F, F−, and F+ scenarios
by−2.23% to−0.40%. The tax rates and the tax form can directly impact
on the variation of energy efficiency. Moreover, we found that the elas-
ticity of energy efficiency with respect to ad valorem tax rate is higher
than that of fixed and specific tax, whichmeans that higher ad valorem
tax can result in higher energy efficiency in all industries in China, espe-
cially in the agriculture, construction and service industries, by 4.53%,
4.22 and 4.28% respectively.5.3. Environment impact
5.3.1. CO2 reduction
Fig. 16 shows CO2 emissions reductions during 2017–2030 in all CM
scenarios relative to the S scenario. The reduction in S+, A, A− and A+
scenarios will be 0.16–0.19 billion tons of CO2 (Bt-CO2), 0.19–0.73 Bt-
CO2, −0.015-0.45 Bt-CO2 and 0.40–0.98 Bt-CO2 respectively during
2018–2030. In the S+, F, F− and F+ scenarios, CO2 emissions will in-
crease by 0.18–0.21 Bt-CO2, 0.32–0.44 Bt-CO2, 0.52–0.55 Bt-CO2 and
0.10–0.32 Bt-CO2, respectively. Although CO2 emissions will decrease
in the S scenario, the positive impact on CO2 reduction will reduce
year by year. For instance, the reduction will be 0.19 Bt-CO2 in 2018
but will be 0.16 Bt-CO2 in 2030. There will be no long-term significant
benefits for reducing CO2 emissions. However, we found that in the ad
valorem tax scenarios, the reduction will increase over time. Moreover,
we also found that the capacity of CO2 emissions control under adMTP ELC TRA CST RST OTH SER
F+ A A- A+
M scenarios relative to S scenario in 2030.
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Fig. 16. CO2 emissions reduction during 2017–2030 in all CM scenarios relative to S scenario.
11B. Lin, Z. Jia / Energy Economics 84 (2019) 104496valorem tax is greater than under specific tax, and the latter is greater
than the fixed tax. The result shows that the elasticity of ad valorem
tax is higher than that of fixed tax and specific tax, which means a
higher tax rate can result in greater CO2 reduction.
5.3.2. CO2 emission intensity
CO2 emission intensity is calculated by CO2 emissions divided by
GDP. CO2 emission intensity (CI) during 2017–2030 in all CM scenarios
relative to S scenario is illustrated in Fig. 17. CI will be
0.156 tons of CO2/thousand yuan in 2017 and will reduce to
0.128 tons of CO2/thousand yuan in 2030 in S scenario. CI in the S−,
S+, F, F−, F+, A, A−, and A+ scenarios in 2030 will be 0.130, 0.127,0.11
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Fig. 17. CO2 emission intensity during 2017–2030.132, 0.133, 0.131, 0.121, 0.124, and 0.119 tons of CO2/thousand
yuan, respectively. The results show that the ad valorem tax can reduce
CO2 emission intensitymore significantly than other tax forms.More so,
the reductionwill increase over time, indicating that ad valorem tax has
the highest efficiency of long term emission reduction, especially in high
tax rate scenario.
According to Intended Nationally Determined Contributions of
China, China tries to achieve the peaking of CO2 emissions around
2030 and lower CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by 60%to 65% from the
2005 level. According to data in Global Carbon Budget and National
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2030 the emission intensity should under
0.126 tons of CO2/thousand yuan. The results in this paper show that3 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
F+ A A- A+
0 in all CM scenarios relative to S scenario.
Table 8
Sensitivity analysis.
Scenario Key indicators (2030) Elasticity of
domestic output
AEEI
−10% +10% −10% +10%
S CO2 emissions −1.042% 0.921% −2.777% 2.828%
GDP −0.008% 0.007% −3.086% 3.165%
F CO2 emissions −1.128% 0.997% −2.913% 2.972%
GDP −0.005% 0.004% −3.082% 3.160%
A CO2 emissions −0.895% 0.789% −2.921% 2.983%
GDP −0.010% 0.009% −3.096% 3.175%
12 B. Lin, Z. Jia / Energy Economics 84 (2019) 104496peak will be not achieved by doing nothing about emission reduction
work. However, the target of carbon intensity could be achieved in A,
A− and A+ scenarios.
6. Sensitivity analysis
As some of the parameters are subjective. This paper conducts a sen-
sitivity analysis to test the sensitivity of these subjective parameters,
such as elasticity and AEEI (Table 8). We assumes that the value of
these parameters decrease or increase by 10%, we then re-run our
model to see the changes in these key indicators. We found that the
elasticity has less impact on GDP, but it will decrease or increase CO2
emissions to a certain extent, from −1.128% to 0.997%. When elasticity
changes, CO2 emissions are more vulnerable in fixed tax scenario and
GDP is more vulnerable in ad valorem tax scenario. The key indicators
are more sensitive to the value of AEEI than elasticity, as AEEI will in-
crease or decrease the output year by year. However, in general, the sen-
sitivity of key indicators to these parameters is not high.
7. Conclusions, policy implication and limitations
7.1. Conclusions
This paper constructs a dynamic recursive CGEmodel to analyze the
impact of energy resource tax on energy, economyand the environment
from the perspective of tax form and tax rates. The conclusions of the
study are as follows:
GDP performance is better in specific tax and fixed tax scenarios and
worse in ad valorem tax scenario. The proportion of indirect tax on fossil
energy production sectors is sensitive to the tax form and tax rate: it will
be 1.96% to 7.27% in 2030. The change in indirect tax on the main down-
stream enterprises of energy production sectors is opposite the change in
energy production sectors. Increasing the tax rates of energy production
will increase commodity prices. Thefixed taxwill reduce prices in all pro-
duction while the ad valorem tax will increase the price. The elasticity of
prices in fossil energy productionwith respect to energy tax is higher that
of non-energy prices. Adjusting the tax system and the tax rate has im-
portant implications for energy conservation, while having a minor im-
pact on the output of other industries. The impact of an increasing
energy tax on energy demand is greater than the impact on sectoral out-
put, indicating that energy efficiency will increase to some extent. In ad
valorem tax scenarios, the reduction will increase over time.
Generally, the high sensitivity of GDP, energy demand, commodity
price and CO2 reduction to ad valorem tax rate indicates that govern-P
C
ments should pay more attention to tax rates of enterprises which are
on ad valorem duty. Moreover, we found that it is unrealistic to attempt
to use the changes in the tax rate of resources tax to achieve the goal of
economic welfare and emission reductions. Higher emission reduction
capacity will result in greater GDP loss using the method of changing
the tax rate.
7.2. Policy implication
According to the conclusions of this study, this paper provides the
following policy suggestions:
1) The relatively low rates for resources tax, including coal, oil, and nat-
ural gas, leading to a relatively lowutilization cost of these resources,
which is difficult to promote the rational development and utiliza-
tion of resources. It is also not conducive for the formation of a rea-
sonable price mechanism for energy resources. Therefore, we
suggest that increasing the tax rate of energy resource is very
necessary.
2) Ad valorem tax can promote energy efficiency in all industries and
reduce CO2 emissions. Therefore, this paper supports the direction
of China's resource tax reform. However, we noticed that the gov-
ernment wants to ensure that the overall burden of coal companies
will not increase when reforming coal resource tax. We argue that it
is not reasonable to leave the burden of fossil energy industries un-
changed in the process of China's resource tax reform. As the elastic-
ity of CO2 reduction on ad valorem tax rate is greater than other tax
forms, it is better to increase the tax rate and relax control on energy
prices reasonably, so that price can guide the market. More so, the
negative impact on non-energy sectors and household is not signif-
icant (see Sections 5.1 and 5.2).
3) As the price and output of coal are less sensitive to resource taxes
than oil and natural gas, while China's coal consumption is huge,
the tax rate on coal can be moderately increased after China's re-
source tax reform, but the tax rate on oil and natural gas should
not be excessively increased.
7.3. Limitations
This paper compares the effects of different tax systems on energy,
economy, and environment by using a dynamic recursive CGE model.
However, some problems still exist that need to be further addressed.
For example, although oil and gas account for a small proportion of
total primary energy consumption, price controls in these two markets
may have a negative impact on the accuracy of model simulations. The
authors will endeavor to tackle this problem in the future.
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17AZD013).Appendix A. Main abbreviationsTable A.1
The main abbreviations in this paper.Abbr. Full nameFE Primary Fossil Energy
E Capital-Energy bundle
T
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C
C
C
A
G
C
SA
C
C
S/
F/Full nameAE Value-Added & Energy
ES Constant Elasticity of Substitution
ET Constant Elasticity of Transformation
O2 Carbon dioxide
EEI Autonomous Energy Efficiency Improvement
DP Gross Domestic Product
I CO2 emission intensity
M Social Accounting MatrixGE Computable General Equilibrium
M Counter-measured scenario
S−/S+ Scenarios that energy sectors are on Specific duty
F−/F+ Scenarios that energy sectors are on Fixed duty
/A−/A+ Scenarios that energy sectors are on Ad valorem dutyAAppendix B. Framework of CGE model in this paperB.1. Production blockPFEi ¼ αpfei δpfe;coali COAL
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ðB:44ÞB.7. Description of the equationsEqs. (B.1) to (B.4) are a bundle of CES production function. The first is the CES function, the second is the first-order condition of the CES function,
and the last is the value balance equation. From Eqs. (B.1) to (B.16), all of them are CES based bundles in production block. Eqs. (B.17) to (B.19) de-
scribe the equation bundle of Leontief production function.
Income and expenditure block expresses the behaviors of household savings (Eq. (B.20)), government savings (Eq. (B.21)), household consump-
tion (Eq. (B.22)), government consumption (Eq. (B.23)), direct tax (Eq. (B.24)), indirect tax (Eq. (B.25)), and tariff (Eq. (B.26)).
Eqs. (B.27) and (B.28) describe the relationship between domestic price and international price. Eq. (B.29) expresses trade deficit. Eqs. (B.30) to
(B.32) are Armington assumption, which describe the behavior of consuming import goods and consuming domestic goods. Eq. (B.30) is a CES func-
tion and the next two equations are first order conditions of it. Similar to the former equation bundle, Eqs. (B.33) to (B.35) describe the behavior of
domestic enterprises to distribute their product to domestic market and international market. Among them, Eq. (B.33) is a CET function.
Eqs. (B.36) and (B.39) describe the relationship among fossil fuel, CO2 emissions, and factor inputs in production block.
Eq. (B.40) is mathematical expression of macroscopic closure. Eqs. (B.41), (B.42) and (B.43) are mathematical expressions of market clearing.
Eq. (B.44) is utility function, which is also an objective function.
Appendix C. Simplified and balanced SAM in this paperTable C.1
SAM in this paper.A Lab C InT TA
La
C
In
T
R
U
G
I
R
R U G I R Total103,981 3599 12,519 5833 18,413 13,767 158,112
b 24,939 24,9397296 7296
T 7749 77491319 1319
7068 1115 818317,871 6180 24,052
7749 1319 148 436 96524437 11,097 3819 −939 18,413
12,827 12,827tal 158,112 24,939 7296 7749 1319 8183 24,052 9652 18,413 12,827ToNotes: A is activity, Lab is labor, C is capital, InT is indirect tax, T is tariff, R is rural population, U is urban population, G is government, I is investment, and R is rest of the world.References
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